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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HARRY KIRK CREAMER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7664

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appell'ant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This action is a suit for personal injuries brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 51,
et seq. Plaintiff, Harry Kirk Creamer, brought this action
against his employer The Ogden Union Railway and Depot
Company for permanent damage to his heart allegedly
sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendant in
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causing the plaintiff's heart to be overtaxed and overexerted. The cause of action allegedly arose on the 11th day
of August, 1949, at Ogden, Utah. The case was tried to
a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
in the sum of $15,000.00. From this judgment the defendant
appeals.
The record on appeal contains all the proceedings in
the action as we deemed it necessary to include the whole
record for a complete understanding of the case. The record citations used throughout this brief which refer to
matters of evidence are taken from the page numbers of
the transcript of the evidence contained in the record.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harry Kirk Creamer, the plaintiff in this action, was
employed by the defendant, The Ogden Union Railway and
Depot Company on August 21, 1946 as a coach cleaner
(Tr. 13). Between that time and the date of the accident
alleged, which was August 11, 1949, he performed the duties
of a coach cleaner for his employer. His duties as a coach
cleaner consisted of washing railroad cars and servicing
trains. The servicing of trains included supplying the same
with water and other supplies and also included the duty
of icing cars (Tr. 14). This work was performed upon
passenger cars and diners and was not connected with the
handling of freight cars. At the time of his employment
by the defendant the plaintiff was required to undergo a
physical examination. This examination, made by Dr.
Rulon F. Howe of Ogden, disclosed no physical defects. A
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copy of the report made by Dr. Howe is Exhibit "4" contained in the record (Tr. 132). It is particularly to be
noted that the report made to the company disclosed no
defects in so far as the plaintiff's heart was conce·rned.
On August 11, 1949 the plaintiff was 36 years of age,
was 6 feet 1 inch tall, and weighed 215 pounds (Tr. 66).
He had never been sick for twenty years prior to that date
(Tr. 12). In addition, the evidence disclosed that he had
satisfactorily passed a physical examination at the Ogden
Arsenal some time before his employment by the Depot
Company (Tr. 13), and that he had performed manual
work during most of his life (Tr. 12). The record also
discloses that he had been active in hunting and fishing
and other forms of athletic recreation (Tr. 68).
On August 11, 1949 he was assigned to the task of
icing diners. The methods of performing this work and
also the extent of the work which Creamer did will be discussed in detail hereafter. At the end of his shift on this
date and during the course of the ensuing night and day
Creamer suffered a heart failure, which resulted in a permanent worsening of his heart condition for which damages are sought in this action.
The medical evidence from plaintiff's doctor who testified as a witness, and also from the doctors who testified
for the defendant establishes beyond any question that
Creamer was suffering from rheum,atic heart disease prior
to his employment by the defendant (Tr. 36). (The testimony of the defendant's doctors corroborates our statement.) This condition is caused by disease, which produces
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inflammation of the heart and the muscles of the heart,
resulting in scarring of the valves, and not by injury (Tr.
23) . This scar tissue produced by disease is often a subtle
thing with no symptoms at all (Tr. 26). It is not unusual
that physical examination by a competent doctor will fail
to reveal such a condition (Tr. 36). Such a condition does
not always manifest itself during the life of the individual,
but usually does so sooner or later, and the years between
the ages of 35 and 45 are typically the period when failure
of the heart occurs (Tr. 26). Usually failure of the heart,
as distinguished from the rheumatic heart disease, is actually precipitated by exertion which the doctors classified
as unusual and severe (Tr. 29). (This is confirmed by the
testimony of Dr. Don D. Olsen for the defendant.) But the
words "unusual and severe" exertion as used by the doctors
refer to a type of exertion which is unusual and severe for
a person with a damaged heart and do not mean that the
exertion would be injurious to a person with a normal
heart (Tr. 39). Any type of relatively strenuous effort may
cause such failure of a rheumatic heart, whereas, the heart
of a normal person will not be damaged by the same activity (Tr. 40). Both of the doctors who testified concerning
Creamer's condition at the trial stated that he had suffered
a permanent diminution of his working capacity in that
the failure of the heart had permanently impaired its previously weakened and rheumatic condition. Dr. Don D.
Olsen testified that the work which Creamer did on the day
of the accident had probably contributed to the failure of
his heart, but that this work, while strenuous, was not dangerous to a person with a normal heart. We respectfully
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submit that a summarization of the medical testimony
concerning the nature of Creamer's so-called "injury", is
as follows:
1. The plaintiff was afflicted with rheumatic
heart disease before he was employed by the defendant.
2. This fact was unknown to Creamer and
to the defendant until after the heart went into
failure in August, 1949, despite the fact that the
plaintiff had been physically examined before that
time.
3. It is neither unusual nor indicative of any
blameworthiness that such rheumatic heart condition was not discovered on medical examination.
4. Strenuous work performed by Creamer
for the defendant probably precipitated the actual
heart failure, but did not cause the rheumatic heart
condition.
5. This strenuous work was characterized by
Dr. J. G. Olson as severe and unusual and by Dr.
Don D. Olsen as difficult exertion, but it is clear
from the testimony of both of these doctors that
what was meant by the language used was exertion
which was excessive for a diseased heart, although
not excessive for a normal, healthy heart.
6. The actual work performed by the plaintiff on the day of the so-called accident was neither
dangerous nor harmful to a normal person. Concerning this matter Dr. Don D. Olsen's testimony,
which is absolutely uncontradicted in the record, is
as follows:
"Q. Doctor, are you familiar with the work
in icing diners down here in the yards of the 0. U.
R. & D. Railway Company?
"A. Quite familiar. I understand they carry
ice up and put in the cars.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

"Q. In climbing ladders with a cake of ice
weighing one hundred pounds?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Doctor, assuming a normal person, with
no heart disease, and who is otherwise in good
health, assume he is called upon to work during the
course of approximately three hours to carry chunks
of ice of one hundred pounds up a ladder of about
fourteen feet high, I think the testimony is, and
upon the top to break into smaller pieces and put
down in the holes there in top of the diners. Assume
the man who does that, he is about thirty-five or
thirty-six years of age. He is in the neighborhood of
6' 4" tall and he weighs approximately 205 pounds,
I think the testimony is, and normally muscular;
would that kind of exercise damage or in any way
injure the heart of such a person?
"A. I wouldn't think so.
"Q. Is that overexertion for the heart of a
normal individual?
"A. No." (Tr. 126, 127.)

The facts pertaining to the alleged overexertion which
precipitated Creamer's heart failure are simple. At approximately 11:30 A. M. on the 11th of August, 1949, the
plaintiff was assigned by his foreman to ice three dining
cars. This work required that he fill bunkers on top of
the diners with small chunks of ice. Alongside the various
tracks where these diners had been placed other employes
had spotted small hand trucks loaded with large cakes of
ice, weighing approximately 300 pounds each. A photograph of one of these hand trucks is contained in the file
as Exhibit "2". It was Creamer's duty to cut these large
pieces of ice into smaller pieces, which he could carry on
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his shoulder to the top of a diner, where he would chip
the ice into small fragments, filling the bunkers ( Tr. 18,
74, 75). Creamer knew that the existing instructions from
his supervisors were that each man was to choose the size
of the piece of ice which he carried to the top of a diner.
The instructions further provided that no one was to attempt to carry a larger piece of ice than the man himself
felt that he was able to handle (Tr. 42, 71, 72). Pursuant
to these orders and in accordance with the custom adopted
by various men who performed the same work for the
Depot Company, Creamer made between 26 and 30 trips up
a ladder approximately 14 or 15 feet high carrying chunks
of ice weighing approximately 100 pounds each during the
remainder of his shift on that day. In addition to this
work of carrying ice up the ladder, he also chipped these
100-pound pieces of ice into small chunks to feed them into
bunkers at the top of the diners. There were actually three
and one-half hours remaining on Creamer's shift when
this work was commenced (Tr. 74, 76). Creamer knew that
this was plenty of time for the job (Tr. 76), and he likewise knew that if he finished the task before 3 :00 P. M.,
when his shift ended, he would be permitted to quit work
and spend the time getting himself cleaned up and ready
to go home, although he was being paid until 3:00 P. M.
(Tr. 76). That he was not rushed in doing this work is
evidenced further by his testimony that at approximately
1:30 P.M. he rested for a period of approximately one-half
hour while smoking and talking with a friend, who was a
fellow employe off duty (Tr. 50, 51). The fact as to this
rest period was corroborated by his own witness, Louis D.
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Waymen (Tr. 84). At the time when Creamer finished the
job between 2:00 P. M. and 2:30 P. M. there was at least
half an hour remaining in his shift (Tr. 75). At the conclusion of the job he became short of breath, was dizzy,
and experienced the symptoms which are attached to a
failure of the heart. It is perhaps significant that Dr. J. G.
Olson, plaintiff's witness, thought plaintiff's heart had begun to fail about ten days before this date (Tr. 35).
Briefly summarized, the facts concerning the activities in which Creamer engaged which precipitated the injury to his heart, are as follows:
In a period of approximately three hours he carried between 26 and 30 separate pieces of ice, weighing
approximately 100 pounds each, up a ladder 14 or 15 feet
high, to the tops of three different diners.
1.

2. He performed the work under express instructions
that he should carry no larger chunks of ice than he felt
himself capable of handling.
3. At the top of these cars he chipped the ice into
smaller pieces, about the size of a man's fist, and thereafter placed the same in bunkers.
4. He set his own pace in doing the work, having
plenty of time within which to do the job, and sufficient
time to rest for at least one-half hour, and also to finish
the job at least one-half hour before the end of his work
shift.
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Several witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the
p\"ocess of icing diners was hard work, involving strenuous demands upon the strength of workmen. Other witnesses for the plaintiff testified that there were mechanical devices such as fork lifts and other types of machinery
which were capable of lifting ice to the top of a diner.
Since we admitted at the trial and are now willing to concede that machinery exists which is capable of lifting ice
to the top of a diner, we see no point in detailing the testimony in this regard. We likewise concede and the evidence
shows that the work of icing diners is hard work. The
evidence further disclosed that this manual method of icing
diners had been used for many years; that more than 100
different individuals had performed that work during the
six years prior to the accident, and that women had done
this work during the war years, although the women who
had done the work had not been permitted to choose the
size of the piece of ice which they were to carry to the top
of a car. Instead, they had been required to carry a piece
no larger than 30 pounds because the foreman understood
that the state laws so required (Tr. 116, 117).
The only express medical testimony concerning the
effect which this work as performed by Creamer would
have on a normal heart is to be found in the testimony of
Dr. Don D. Olsen hereinabove set forth verbatim, wherein
he stated that the work was not dangerous to a person with
a normal heart. Therefore, we assert that evidence is completely lacking that the defendant required of its workmen
the exercise of effort which was dangerous if the workmen
were in a normal condition.
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POINTS UPON WHICH APPPELLANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT.
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WHOLLY
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT CONTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFF'S INJURY.
POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 GIVEN BY THE TRIAL
COURT AT THE REQUEST OF THE PLAINTIFF ON THE SUBJECT OF DAMAGES CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE
REASON THAT SAID INSTRUCTION IS ARGUMENTATIVE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WHOLLY
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT CONTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFF'S INJURY.
(a)

The negligence which plaintiff charged against
the defendant:

By his complaint plaintiff alleged that liability of the
defendant existed on the following grounds:
1. Negligence in requiring the plaintiff to pull
heavily loaded ice wagons manually to and from
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various positions along the platforms in the Ogden
Yard without mechanical assistance.
2. Negligence in requiring the plaintiff to carry 100-pound cakes of ice on his shoulder up a ladder to the tops of diners, subjecting the plaintiff to
unusual hazards and dangers of overexertion and
overwork.
3. Negligence in failing and neglecting to furnish the plaintiff with a tractor or other mechanical device with which to pull ice wagons along the
platforms above referred to.
4. Negligence in failing to furnish the plaintiff with a mobile elevator to lift the ice blocks to
the tops of the diners.
5. Negligence in failing to furnish the plaintiff with a conveyor belt to lift said ice blocks to
the tops of diners. (R. 3, 4.)
Stripped of the verbiage employed by plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff's complaint charges the defendant with negligence in requiring the plaintiff to overexert himself in two
different ways when machinery could have performed the
task. The first alleged overexertion is the handling of
wagons loaded with ice along the platform, and the second
is the carrying of ice manually to the tops of diners. Plaintiff's whole contention is that the defendant was guilty of
negligence in requiring the plaintiff to perform these two
tasks manually, rather than with the aid of machinery.
(b)

The facts as to these charges of negligence:

The evidence concerning the work of moving ice wagons along the platform does not have any significance
whatever in determining the question of the defendant's
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negligence. The plaintiff did not even suggest that he had
overexerted himself in handling ice wagons on the day of
the accident. Concerning the task of icing the first two
diners on which he worked on August 11, 1949, the only
mention which plaintiff made of moving ice wagons is to
be found at page 49 of the Transcript, where he stated
that he moved three or four small wagons partially loaded
with two or three cakes of ice about 20 or 30 feet to ice
the first diner. In icing the third diner on that date plaintiff testified that he moved another ice wagon approximately 100 yards with the assistance of two other men
(Tr. 51). There is no testimony that this work constituted
an undue burden upon the plaintiff's heart, nor is there
any testimony that this work had any effect in precipitating the failure of the plaintiff's heart. In the hypothetical
question which plaintiff's counsel asked of Dr. J. G. Olson
concerning the cause of the failure of the plaintiff's heart
no mention was made of any work in connection with moving
ice wagons. Dr. J. G. Olson attributed the failure of plaintiff's heart entirely to the work which Creamer did in
carrying 100 pound cakes of ice up a ladder to the tops of
the three diners (Tr. 28, 29). In the absence of any evidence from the plaintiff or from his doctor or any other
witness that moving the ice wagons resulted in overexertion or resulted in any failure of the plaintiff's heart, we
respectfully submit that the only remaining theory of negligence on which the plaintiff can possibly recover is the
alleged negligence of the defendant in requiring the plaintiff to carry 100-pound cakes of ice to the tops of these
diners without machinery to do the work for him.
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The facts pertaining to the work which Creamer was
asked to perform in carrying ice to the tops of the diners
have bee!). heretofore set forth in some detail in this brief.
It remains for us and for this court to analyze these facts
to determine whether or not an issue was presented for
submission to a jury as to the defendant's negligence.

(c)

As a matter of law the evidence in this case is
not sufficient to establish the negligence charged:

The negligence charged in connection with moving of
ice wagons being completely unsubstantiated as heretofore
pointed out, we confine our discussion to the possibility that
the defendant was negligent in requiring the plaintiff to
carry ice up a ladder to the top of the dining cars on the
date of the so-called accident. Intelligent determination
of the problem requires only the application of fundamental
basic legal principles to the facts involved. As said by Mr.
Justice Latimer, speaking for this court, in the case of
Lasagna v. McCarthy, et al., 111 Utah 269, 177 P. 2d 734:
"Negligence of the employer being the basis for
recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
it is well to return to the ordinary definition of the
term, which is 'the omission to do something which
a reasonable person, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do: or the doing of something which
a prudent person under like circumstances would
not do.'"
Application of this well settled definition of the concept of
negligence to the facts of the case at bar makes it obvious
that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
would justify reasonable persons in arriving at the conclusion that the defendant was negligent. The Depot Company neither asked nor required of the plaintiff that he
do work which was dangerous to the health of a normal
human being and exposed the plaintiff to no danger which
either he or the defendant knew, or should have known,
to exist. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the
defendant neither omitted an act which a reasonable person would have done, nor committed an act which a prudent person would not have done. Because there is machinery in existence capable of eliminating the manual
effort required to lift ice to the top of a diner, it does not
follow that it is negligence to require that the task be performed by manual labor instead of by use of the machinery.
Proof that there are two methods of accomplishing
the same task does not establish that either method is negligent. That the first method may be quicker, easier or even
safer than the second does not prove or establish that the
second method exposes someone to an unreasonable risk
and is therefore negligent. As was said by Mr. Justice
Latimer in his concurring opinion in the case of John D.
Marshall v. The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company,
in ... Utah ... , 221 P. 2d 868:
"The test to determine plaintiff's conduct is not
whether there were safer places which could have
been selected by him, but rather, whether or not
under the facts and circumstances known to him he
acted as a reasonably prudent person."
The question in this case is not whether there exists another
method of doing the work which Creamer did. The ques-
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tion is whether or not the method designated for Creamer's
use deviated from the standard of reasonable conduct.
Although the icing of diners admittedly requires considerable effort on the part of the men who perform the
task, there was no justification for the· contention that
Creamer was required to abuse himself on the day of the
accident in performing the assignment he had received.
The work did not require that he make 26 or 30 trips up
and down the ladder without rest and at high speed. Under
the evidence the technique employed by Creamer in icing
these diners was to carry several 100-pound pieces of ice
to the top of a car where he would there chip the 100-pound
pieces into smaller chunks, with a repetition of this process
until a diner was iced. With a maximum of 30 trips up a
ladder on three different cars, it is obvious that Creamer
not only had the opportunity, but was compelled to space
the actual climbing over a substantial period of time on the
day of the accident. And the facts should not therefore be
considered as though Creamer made or was asked to make
30 consecutive trips without pause or respite. The effect
upon a human being of any activity involving effort is
always directly related to the speed at which the activity
is performed. To walk 100 yards on level ground in five
minutes is one thing; to run a 100-yard dash in ten seconds
is another. Creamer admittedly finished the job at least
one-half hour before the end of his shift, in addition to resting for one-half hour during the course of the job. It cannot therefore be disputed that the speed at which he did
the job was completely of his own choice.
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In the absence of any knowledge that Creamer was
suffering from a heart condition which made it foreseeable
that he would suffer an impairment of his health in performing the job to which he was assigned by handling ice
of a size he chose and at his own speed, we respectfully
submit that no jury could fairly say that the Depot Company chose a method of performing the work which a
reasonable prudent man would have considered as dangerous, unsafe or improper. Not only is this fundamental proposition unassailable upon a logical examination of the facts,
but it is also abundantly supported by authoritative texts
and decisions.
In a rather complete annotation entitled "Liability of
Employer for Injury to Employee due to his Physical Unfitness for the Work to Which he was Assigned", 175 A.
L. R. 982, the annotator summarizes the law as follows,
at page 985:
"An employer is liable to an employee for injuries received in the course of employment, in the
absence of statute declaring otherwise, only upon the
ground of negligence on the employer's part. The
employer is not an insurer of the safety of his employees, unless made so by statute, and is not liable
for consequences of the dangers of the employment;
in order to charge him with liability for injury to
an employee due to the employee's physical unfitness for the work to which he was assigned it is
necessary to show negligence on the employer's part
in assigning the employee to the work in question
or in requiring him to continue at work for which
he was not specifically fitted; this means that in any
event the employer must know or be charged with
knowledge of the employee's unfitness."
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In l?olume 65 of Corpus Juris Secundum, at page 401,
in dealing with this subject is the following statement:
"In the absence of anything which should reasonably suggest such a condition, one is not required
to anticipate that another may, for some reason, be
unable to exercise ordinary care for his own safety,
but the duty to exercise special care with respect
to a person, who is for any reason unable to take
such care of himself as the normal person might,
arises only where there is actual or imputed knowledge of the incapacity. Accordingly, negligence cannot be predicated on conduct which would have
reached the standard of ordinary care with respect
to an ordinary and normal person in the absence of
any actual or imputed knowledge of any infirmity
or incapacity of the person in question."

American Jurisprudence states the rule in the following language :
"As hereinbefore stated, the duty to use care
is based upon knowledge of danger. It is also true
that the care which must be exercised in any particular situation is in proportion to the actor's knowledge, actual or imputed, of the danger to another in
the act to be performed. The degree of care necessary to constitute the ordinary care required of a
person upon any particular occasion is measured by
reference to the circumstances of danger and risk
known to such person at the time. Conduct which
will be considered extremely careful under one condition of knowledge, and one state of circumstances,
may be grossly negligent with different knowledge
and in changed circumstances. The consequence
likely to be the result of an act or omission is a fact
to be taken into consideration in determining the
kind and amount of caution to be exercised. The de-
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gree of care required to be used in any given case
to avoid the imputation of negligence must be according to the circumstances or in proportion to the
danger reasonably to be anticipated-such care as is
ordinarily sufficient under similar circumstances to
avoid danger and secure safety. Where a danger actually is foreseen, the duty is imposed to adopt every
possible precaution to avoid an injury therefrom.
It will be observed that ordinary care requires only
that means be taken to avoid such dangers as are
known or reasonably to be apprehended. In other
words, ordinary care has reference to probabilities
of danger rather than possibilities of peril. Moreover, the rule of reasonable. care must be considered
not in the light of the accident which happened but
with reference to that which ordinary prudence
should have anticipated as likely to happen. The
mere fact that an accident was avoidable does not
prove that there was fault in not anticipating and
providing against it." 38 Am. Jur. 678.
It is well settled that the common law rule of ordinary
prudence maintains under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Craven, 185 F. 2d 176.
In that case the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made
the following observation:

"The great majority of railroad accidents (including those not involving negligence) could by
some means be prevented. The test is whether reasonable men, examining the circumstances and the
likelihood of injury, would have taken those steps
necessary to remove the danger. (Citing cases.)
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the
common law rule of ordinary prudence maintains,
and a railroad is not necessarily required to employ
the latest or the safest devices. (Citing cases.)
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*

*

*

*

*

"The chances of injury to plaintiff, however,
were no greater than those inherent in his type of
employment. At no other place in the yard was it
negligent for the railroad to obstruct plaintiff's way
with moving cars, or to fail to provide a bridge over
the tracks. It cannot be said that a different standard of maintenance was required to protect plaintiff at that point where he entered upon or left his
duties. The danger was no greater at this point
and plaintiff, as a brakeman, knew how to avoid
whatever danger that existed. It would have been
unreasonable to expect the railroad to take those
extreme measures necessary to remove this slight
danger.''
A problem identical in principle to that in the case
at bar was recently decided by the New York courts in the
case of Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., Inc., 103 N. Y.
S. 2d 137. In that case the plaintiff suffered from a chronic
valvular heart lesion, with resultant low blood pressure
and defective blood circulation. Her feet were frostbitten
while traveling on defendant's bus, because the defendant
permitted the temperature inside the bus to reach a point
which her system was unable to withstand, but which would
have done no damage to a normal person. In determining
that the plaintiff had not made a case which should be
submitted to a jury, although there was some evidence
that the bus was equipped with a defective heater, the
New York court said:
"Plaintiff's InJuries did not come within the
realm of reasonable foreseeability. Defendant was
under no legal duty to guard against dangers which
could not reasonably be foreseen. Negligence is to
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be gauged by the ability of one to anticipate danger.
The test of actionable negligence is not what could
have been done to have prevented a particular accident, but what a reasonably prudent and careful
person would have done under the circumstances in
the discharge of his duty to the injured party. Failure to guard against a remote possibility of accident,
or one which could not, in the exercise of ordinary
care, be foreseen, does not constitute negligence. As
phrased by Chief Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A.
L. R. 1253 : 'The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed.' That no injury was
sustained by other passengers demonstrates that
there was no danger which could reasonably be apprehended. Had defendant been advised of plaintiff's condition it might well have afforded her some
form of additional protection. * * * To hold a
carrier liable for injuries or illness to all persons,
normal and abnormal, especially when the abnormality is not known, would make a carrier an insurer
of the well-being of all passengers. As yet the point
has not been reached where such is the law.

*

*

*

*

*

"The cases cited by respondent are readily distinguishable. They all deal with foreseeable danger
to normal persons and acts which would constitute
negligence to normal persons, and stand only for the
proposition that a party once guilty of negligence
cannot escape additional consequences or damages
because of a previously existing condition. Here
plaintiff would not have been injured at all but for
her previous physical condition."
The opinion aptly expresses the basic distinction between those cases in which liability is imposed for aggravation of a pre-existing condition and cases in which lia-
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bility is denied where such a pre-existing condition, unknown to defendant, is itself the source of danger. To impose liability for conduct which results in aggravating a
pre-existing physical condition where such conduct would
have been negligent as to a plaintiff if he were in normal
condition, is a very different thing than to impose liability
in a case where the unknown physical defect of the plaintiff is the only factor which makes the conduct of the defendant dangerous at all. We think this distinction is particularly significant in the case at bar for the reason that,
as stated by the New York court, "Here, the plaintiff would
not have been injured at all but for his previous physical
condition."
In the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Willhite, 187
S. W. 2d 1010, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
in 1945, the identical problem presented in this case was
also decided. There the plaintiff had sued to recover for
injuries sustained while in the employ of the defendant
railroad as a result of alleged negligence in requiring him
to lift cross-ties without providing a sufficient and adequate
number of fellow workmen. It appeared from the evidence
that the plaintiff had an enlargement of the inguinal rings
and spermatic cord, which rendered him peculiarly susceptible to a rupture or hernia at any time. This condition
was not known to the defendant employer. In lifting ties
the plaintiff sustained a hernia. The Kentucky court made
the following statement concerning the law applicable to
the alleged negligence of the defendant:
"Appellant was not advised of plaintiff's condition, and had the right to assume (plaintiff) to be
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in ordinary physical condition. That being true, (defendant) cannot be charged with negligence unless
it is shown by the evidence that it failed to provide
a sufficient number of workmen to assist a person
of ordinary physique to perform in safety the work
required."
In the case of Bowing v. Delaware Rayon Company,
192 A. 598, the Delaware courts stated the law as follows:
"In this connection this is to be said: The defendant is not charged with the knowledge that the
plaintiff, at any time during her employment, was
ill, or in a weakened condition, or otherwise peculiarly sensitive to the gas, and therefore, owed her
a duty not to expose her to it in any degree. From all
the facts and circumstances, as alleged in the declaration, and as shown by the evidence, the defendant owed to the plaintiff that duty which, in the
circumstances, it owed to the average worker in the
reeling room, and it is not to be held responsible
for injuries resulting from the presence of the gas
in the room in a degree not harmful to the average
person. For, generally, it is not the duty of a master
to establish and maintain conditions which must be
safe for every employee. The conditions must be
reasonably safe for the average employee. If, therefore, you shall be satisfied that the plaintiff, if she
suffered damage as a result of exposure to carbon
disulphide in the reeling room, suffered it because
of some peculiar sensitivity on her part to the gas,
and if the concentration of the gas, if there was gas
there, was not such as would have caused injury to
the average person, then the plaintiff cannot recover, for, in such circumstances, the defendant
would not have been negligent as charged in the
declaration."
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Other courts have followed these well settled principles.

See
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Evans,
(Texas) 175 S. W. 2d 249;
Sowers v. Firginian Railway Company, (W.
Va.) 133 S. E. 325;
Hunt v. New York Central Railroad Co., (New
York) 103 N. Y. S. 2d 355;
Southern Rail1.oay Co. v. Bell, Sheriff, 114 F.
2d 342;
Warden-Pullen Coal Co. v. Wallace, (Okla.) 56
P. 2d 802.
The defendant made motions for a nonsuit, for a directed verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, assigning as the reason therefor the failure of the
plaintiff to produce evidence that the defendant was guilty
of negligence contributing to the plaintiff's injury (Tr.
107, 143; R. 53). These motions were denied by the trial
court. We respectfully submit that the motions should have
been granted and that the trial court should have entered
judgment for the defendant because of the complete absence of any evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. No jury should be permitted to find that an employer is negligent because he assigns an apparently healthy young man to do a few hours of hard work. The term
"reasonable care" would then have a new meaning entirely
unrelated to the actualities of human activity. If the assignment of an employee to do a job at his own rate of
speed, handling objects of a size of his own choice, is negligence, then the standards under which this country was
built and exists have vanished.
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POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 GIVEN BY THE TRIAL
COURT AT THE REQUEST OF THE PLAINTIFF ON THE SUBJECT OF DAMAGES CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE
REASON THAT SAID INSTRUCTION IS ARGUMENTATIVE.
We believe that this court should order that judgment
be entered for the defendant for the reasons herein set
forth. But we also seek the views of this court on one other
matter presented by the trial of this case. Instruction No.
15 was given to the jury by the trial court at the request
of the plaintiff. This instruction was plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 7 verbatim. For the court's convenience
we set forth its wording in full:
"You are instructed that if you find the issues
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
it will then become your duty to award to plaintiff
such damages as you may find from a preponderance
of the evidence will fairly and justly compensate him
for any injury and damage he has sustained as a
proximate result of defendant's negligence complained of by him.
"In determining the amount of such damages,
you are instructed that plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all pain and suffering, if any, both
mental and physical, which he has endured since the
time he sustained his injuries and that he will probably endure in the future ; in determining compensation for pain and suffering, if any, you make take
into consideration its probable duration and its severity. The law furnishes no way by which to measure
what is reasonable compensation for mental and
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physical pain and suffering, but it is left to the
sound judgment and discretion of the jury trying
the case to determine from a preponderance of the
evidence what is reasonable compensation to compensate the plaintiff for any physical or mental pain
and suffering he has endured or will probably endure in the future.
"You are further instructed that you may take
into consideration loss of bodily function, if any,
which plaintiff has suffered or which plaintiff will
probably suffer in the future.
"In determining the amount of damages referred to in the first paragraph of this instruction,
you are further instructed that plaintiff is entitled
to compensation for his actual loss of past earnings,
if any, and for any impairment of earning capacity,
if any, which will diminish his capacity to earn
money in the future, and in considering this latter
you may take into consideration the degree and
character of the loss or impairment of earning capacity, if any, resulting from his injuries and the
length of time it will continue, and award to him
such damages as will fairly and justly compensate
him for the loss of future earnings, if any, which
he will probably suffer in the future.
"You may take into consideration whether the
injury is temporary in its nature or is permanent in
its character.
"The total amount of damages thus assessed for
all of the above matters must not exceed the sum
of $30,000.00, the amount prayed for in plaintiff's
complaint.
"You are further instructed that the burden
rests upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the elements of damage, if any, to
which he may be entitled." (R. 16, 17, 42, 43.)
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In the recent case of Brown v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, Case No. 7520 in the files of this court, not yet
reported, we challenged an instruction almost identical to
Instruction No. 15 as argumentative. It was not necessary
for this court to pass upon our contention in reversing the
judgment in that case. We now therefore renew our charge
that this instruction is argumentative in form and request
the court to so hold. We respectfully submit that the overall tenor of the instruction is clearly argumentative. In
addition, the repeated use of the words "compensate" and
"compensation" throughout the instruction inevitably induces in the jury the impression that liability under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act is in the nature of workmen's compensation and is, therefore, independent of a
determination of negligence on the part of the defendant
company.
The vices of this instruction are observable upon examination of the written word; but they manifest themselves many-fold when the same is read aloud to a jury.
Over a period of years counsel for the plaintiff have "worked
over" this particular instruction for use in F. E. L. A. cases.
The requested instruction is constantly in the process of
being amended and expanded for the definite purpose of
more fully arguing each case in behalf of the plaintiff.
Examination of the instruction shows that the first paragraph thereof advises the jury, in substance, that if the
issues are found in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, then it becomes the duty of the jury to award
the plaintiff damages for such damage as has been sustained
as a result of the defendant's negligence. Thereafter,
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throughout the course of the page and one-half of the instruction, are delineated various items which the jury may
take into consideration in fixing the amount of such damages. Nowhere in the remainder of the instruction is the
jury made aware that any recovery is limited to such damages as were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant.
If the jurors were attorneys studying such instruction it
is likely that they would derive a meaning therefrom which
was not erroneous. But such is is not the fact. The reading
of such an instruction aloud to a jury consumes some substantial time so that to a listener the latter part of the instruction often seems to be divorced from the first paragraph. It seems to us that the wording of the instruction
has been chosen for that very purpose. It is our thought as
we hear this instruction read in nearly every case which
we try against plaintiff's counsel that there is a distinct
likelihood that a juror who hears the latter portion of the
instruction and who is a layman, untrained in court procedure, will in many instances receive the impression that
the plaintiff is entitled to some damages in any event and
without regard to the matter of the defendant's negligence.
This court has held that argumentative instructions
need not and should not be given at the request of either
party. Illustrative of the principle are the cases of Smith
V. Gilbert, 49 Utah 510, 164 P. 1026, and Moore v. UtahIdaho Central Railroad Co., 52 Utah 373, 174 P. 873. Instruction No. 15 not only argues the matter of damages for
the plaintiff, but is also prone to be construed to argue
for the plaintiff that damages should be awarded despite
the fact that the defendant was not guilty of negligence.
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In addition to this feature of the instruction, it is to
be noted that the word "compensate" or the word "corn.
pensation" is used throughout the instruction no less than
eight times. We respectfully submit that this repeated use
of a form of the word "compensation" throughout the instruction is a deliberate and intentional effort on the part
of plaintiff's counsel, acquiesced in by the tri~l court, to
convey to the jury the impression that liability in an F. E.
L. A. case is identical to liability under the workmen's compensation statutes. Counsel for the plaintiff argue to every
jury that the F. E. L. A. is an act provided by Congress
in lieu of workmen's compensation. This instruction is
cunningly designed to plant in the minds of the jurors the
thought that the defendant's liability is as absolute as it
would be under workmen's compensation laws. No other
explanation for the repeated use of this word seems reasonable. Counsel well know that they would not be permitted over objection to make an oral argument clearly
calculated to mislead the jury into the belief that liability
under the F. E. L. A. is identical to liability under workmen's compensation statutes. They habitually skirt as
near to an outright statement to that effect as they dare.
The very narrow gap between what counsel say in oral
argument and a direct statement by them to the effect
that the defendant is liable independent of fault is completely and effectively filled by the erroneous impression
created by Instruction No. 15. Not only is the instruction
therefore subject to the criticism that it argues plaintiff's
case for him, but also it is subject to the objection that it
argues an erroneous legal principle. The Supreme Court of
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the United States has rejected the doctrine that the F. E.
L. A. is a workmen's compensation act. See Jlllyers v. Reading Co., 331 U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 133-1, 91 L. Ed. 1615. There
the Supreme Court said:
"The respondent is not subject, as has been suggested, to an absolute liability to its employees comparable to that established by a workmen's compensation law. See Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. 2d 333."
The tenor of a court's instructions to a jury should
never be such as to argue the case for either side. Care
should always be used to see that the instructions given
are not in their form argumentative, even though they
may technically be correct. Any lawyer with experience
in trial of cases by juries made up of laymen knows that
the members of the jury are often confused and uncertain
at best so that there can be no justification for deliberate
attempts to influence them improperly by argumentative
instructions. A fortiorari the argumentative instructions
should not be calculated to induce erroneous impressions
in the minds of such jurors.
We respectfully submit that a set of instructions generalized in other parts as were the instructions in the case
at bar, containing a detailed discussion of the many items
of damages outlined in Instruction No. 15, constitutes a
distinct emphasis on the subject of damages rather than
on the matter of liability, which can only have the effect
of arguing for plaintiff that he should have some verdict;
The unfairness of this instruction is further magnified by
the implication emanating therefrom that liability of the
defendant is independent of negligence and is identical to
that of the workmen's compensation.
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We realize that this court has rarely been disposed to
reverse a judgment solely upon the basis of argumentative
instructions. But this instruction was framed in a manner
likely to result in a misunderstanding by the jury of the
nature of the defendant's liability. It will be used and reused at the request of plaintiff's counsel until this court
condemns it.
We wish to mention to the court that the defendant
attempted to assist the trial court in avoiding this error.
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury along
the customary lines in connection with damages. Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 9 (R. 27) is the ordinary
damage instruction usually given in personal injury cases
in this State.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, we believe that
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment of "no cause
of action" for the defendant. We also request that this
court condemn as argumentative damage instruction No.
15, so as to eliminate the constantly recurring problem
presented when plaintiff's counsel request such an instruction.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Counsel for Defendant
and Appellant.
10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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